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Abstract 
This paper looks at the struggles faced by German policymakers in the years 
following reunification. East Germany struggled with an immediate transformation from 
a planned economy to a social market economy, while West Germany sent billions of 
Deutsche Marks to its eastern states. Because of the unequal nature of these two 
countries, policymakers had to decide on what they would place more emphasis: social 
benefits for the East or economic protection for the West. The West German state-level, 
Federal Government and the East German governments struggled in finding 
multilaterally beneficial policies. This paper looks at the four key issues of reunification: 
currency conversion, transfer payments, re-privatization, and unemployment. In 
following the German Basic Law, the policies pursued in terms of these issues tended to 
place emphasis on eastern social benefits. 
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1. Introduction: The Unification of a Divided Germany 
In 1949, Germany officially split into two countries – the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). One was communist, the 
other a federal parliamentary republic. One was a state-controlled economy, and the other 
a social market economy. These starkly different styles of government resulted in very 
different economies and standards of living. During this time of separation, the Western 
world did not acknowledge the GDR due to continually mounting tensions with the 
USSR.  After decades of a sputtering economy and political oppression, the East 
Germans spoke out in Leipzig in 1989. Widespread protests across Eastern Europe 
sparked revolutionary change, including the resignation of East German Chairman of the 
Council State, Erich Honecker. The Soviet Union soon began to approach its demise and 
the two Germanys found themselves wishing to reunite.  
Reunification would prove to be difficult, due to the deep schism between the 
FRG and GDR economies. Following World War II, the FRG adopted a free-market 
economy with only limited elements of planning and management, also known as a social 
market economy, to help recover from the war.  The GDR, on the other hand, chose to 
pursue a fully planned economy. In 1948, at the time of the formal division, Fritz 
Selbmann, an official in the Socialist Unity Party (SED) provided insight into the East 
German economic policy and practice:  
We will plan down to the last machine, down to the last production unit of state-
owned industry, and then we will see who is stronger – the planned state-owned 
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industry or the non-planned free economy. For the struggle between free economy 
and planned state-owned economy will take place in practice… Naturally the 
planned economy is stronger; naturally things will go better where man uses his 
reason.1 
 
Initially, Selbmann would turn out to be correct.  The fully planned economy helped save 
the East German economy following the war, especially because of the shortage of 
resources and reparations East Germany had to pay the Soviets for the war-related 
devastation.  However, the GDR could only compete with the FRG for a short period of 
time and by 1971 Erich Honecker ended economic reform attempts and thereby gave up 
competing with West German productivity and consumption.2  Although many countries, 
including the U.S. and West Germany, suffered great economic blows during the 1970s, 
East Germany operated in a way that made recovery impossible.  By the time of collapse, 
GDR productivity was less than 30 percent of its western counterpart. 
 The centralized planned economy hurt East Germany in many ways. The lack of 
competition left businesses with no incentive to reduce costs, increase productivity, or 
innovate. The high government subsidies wasted huge amounts of economic resources. 
Some heavily subsidized goods and services included food, public transportation, energy, 
and rent, among many others. In 1989, subsidies consisted of almost one-quarter of 
planned public expenditure. Furthermore, corporations gave overly generous employee 
benefits, referred to as “general provision”, which paid for things such as kindergarten, 
outpatient services, and vacations. General provision created an environment where 
                                                      
1
 Jörg Roesler, “The Rise and Fall of the Planned Economy in the German Democratic 
Republic, 1945-89,” The German History Society 9, no. 1 (1991): 48, 
http://gh.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/1/46.full.pdf+html (accessed October 27, 2012). 
2
 Roesler, “The Rise and Fall of the Planned Economy,” 55. 
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employees rarely changed jobs, which, combined with the right to work policy, led to 
artificially high levels of employment.3 Employing too many workers decreases 
efficiency and drives costs up for corporations. This causes prices to subsequently 
increase, demand to decrease and, eventually, the economy to suffer. 
GDR production equipment provides a perfect example of the Soviet Bloc’s failed 
economic policy.  With an already deteriorating economy, the SED officials chose to 
invest in modernizing microelectronic production equipment, rather than machines for 
more relevant goods such as food, tools, or building production. By 1989, only 
approximately one-third of machine-tool production and foodstuffs equipment were less 
than five years old, compared to the microelectronic production equipment of which 
more than 50 percent was less than five years old.4 Despite electronics being a lucrative 
business, a certain microchip which cost 8 marks to produce on the world market cost 
East German producers more than 530 marks.5 This 6,625 percent increase in production 
costs emphasizes the gross inefficiency of the centrally-planned economy as well as just 
how far behind East Germany was from the Western World. 
Even in the face of possible reunification, eastern cooperation with West 
Germany was limited. Despite General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s small steps 
towards reform with perestroika and glasnost, his response to West German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl’s 1989 Ten-Point plan for unification proved that the Eastern Bloc would 
not embrace change too readily. On the day following Kohl’s proposal to the West 
German Federal Parliament, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, condemned 
                                                      
3
 Gerhard A. Ritter, The Price of German Unity (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 74-76. 
4
 Roesler, “The Rise and Fall of the Planned Economy,” 56. 
5
 Ritter, The Price of German Unity, 75. 
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the Ten Points plan and publicly opposed any border changes.6  Furthermore, although 
the Soviet powers were open to economic ties with West Germany, neither state was 
willing to make the concessions demanded by the other. 
Creating a mutually beneficial reunification agreement for East and West 
Germany presented a daunting task for both governments. The complex relationships, 
however, did not end with just the East versus the West.  As Allan Riding noted in a New 
York Times article on February 15, 1990, surrounding states, particularly Poland and 
France, worried about the repercussions of a united Germany given its tumultuous and 
aggressive history. Key questions arose regarding the German-Polish borders as well as 
how a united Germany would change the balance of powers in the European Community. 
A fragmented Germany seemed safe, but at the same time, Western powers feared the 
Soviet Union and hoped for its downfall.7 
East-West cooperation and the support of neighboring states were not the only 
hurdles of reunification. The four hurdles outlined in this paper became relevant during 
the reunification process. These hurdles were:  
1. Consolidating the Ost-Mark and the Deutsch Mark 
2. Deciding the amount of transfer payments the West would pay the East 
3. Re-privatizing formerly expropriated properties 
4. Avoiding high unemployment rates.  
The policies designed to solve these problems could focus primarily on either 
economically or socially beneficial results. Therefore, policymakers had to decide which 
outcome was more important. 
                                                      
6
 Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen, Uniting Germany: Actions and Reactions (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994), 76. 
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Three levels of politicians and the Central Bank participated in the reunification 
and placed value on various factors. The West German federal government sought a 
speedy reunification and wanted to appease both the East and the West. East German 
politicians feared an unequal reunification in which the westerners dominated the 
easterners. The West German politicians at the Länder, or state, level placed their 
citizens’ interest first and wanted to control the extent to which they would pay for the 
reunification. The West German Central Bank had existed until reunification with full 
autonomy.8 Due to its freedom from any political authorities or pressures, it preferred 
austere policies that most benefitted the western economy.  Although politicians did not 
come to a unanimous decision, the policies that they pursued tended to place more 
importance on social than economic problems. By doing so, post-1990 Germany turned 
into a psychologically unified country with deep and long-lasting economic issues, such 
as high government debt, tax rates, and unemployment.  
This thesis will explore the four major issues and how politicians decided to solve 
them. The rest of this chapter will present the concerns felt by citizens and politicians 
alike at the start of the reunification process. The second chapter will delve into each 
factor and look at how the chosen policies tended to favor social rather than economic 
benefits. Finally, the conclusion will look at the implications of these policies. 
Consolidating Currencies 
 A major hurdle was how to reconcile the different currencies. While West 
Germany prospered with the Deutschmark, East Germany struggled with its weaker 
                                                      
8
 Andreas Beyer et al., “Opting Out of the Great Inflation: German Monetary Policy After 
the Break Down of Bretton Woods,” NBER Working Paper Series, no.14596 (2008): 9, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14596 (accessed October 1, 2012). 
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Ostmark. Politicians and the Bundesbank, the West German central bank, had to work 
together to placate citizens from both Germanys while protecting the West German 
economy and enabling both economies to converge.  But the question remained how to 
broker such a deal with two such different currencies. The Bundesbank suggested an 
austere program that would minimize damage to the West German economy, while 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl recommended, and eventually implemented a more generous 
program that expedited the unification and placed social issues across Germany above 
economic issues in the West. The politicians and bankers saw before them a zero-sum 
game where both sides desperately wanted to win. 
Transfer Payment Levels 
 As mentioned above, citizens of the West as well as their representatives worried 
that the reunification would result in increased taxes and debt. The stronger economy had 
the responsibility of supporting the weaker economy’s transformation to capitalism. After 
all, the East German economy was becoming a part of the West German economy. The 
Länder, West German federal, and East German politicians would have to come up with 
a solution to finance the reunification without placing too much burden on West German 
taxpayers. 
Returning Expropriated Properties 
 A defining characteristic of Communism was expropriating property. For West 
German businesses, for civilians who had fled or moved to the FRG, and for East 
Germans who had simply lost their homes to the Soviet authorities, the fall of the Soviet 
regime raised the possibility of reclaiming formerly confiscated property. This spread 
fear throughout East Germany and curiosity throughout West Germany.  Eastern 
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businesses had already begun accepting investments from western businesses and feared 
having to pay retribution once unification was complete. Eastern civilians feared former 
homeowners would return to stake their claims and/or significantly raise the rent.9 
Politicians had to decide which would create a more unified country: encouraging private 
investment in East Germany or returning private property to the rightful owners. 
Avoiding High Unemployment   
 Fears of a mass exodus to West Germany posed great concern for future 
employment levels across Germany. An additional concern was that competition with 
West German corporations would result in East German enterprises failing. 10 Fewer 
factories meant fewer jobs, and with an open border, Easterners could flood the West, 
creating more job competition in a country that already accepted increasingly high 
numbers of migrant workers. Clearly, neither East nor West Germany would benefit from 
increasing unemployment, and therefore policy makers would have to approach this 
problem very carefully and deliberately so as to not upset the balance. Furthermore, the 
socialist system had provided many benefits and fostered artificially high levels of 
employment. East Germans would lose both of these comforts with the introduction of a 
social market. To ease this loss, East Germany adopted West German employment 
benefits, but altered them in an even more socially advantageous way, which would be 
very expensive for the West and create an inefficient workforce in the East. 
                                                      
9
 Hämäläinen, Uniting Germany: Actions and Reactions, 130. 
10
 W.R Smyser., The Economy of United Germany: Colossus at the Crossroads (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 32. 
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2. Unification: Competing Economic and Social Policies 
2.1 Conversion Rate of Currency Turnover 
 The four previously mentioned hurdles – currency turnover, transfer payments, re-
privatization and unemployment – created an extremely delicate situation for politicians 
and economists alike. The issue alone of currency turnover caused disagreement between 
the Bundesbank and politicians, the Bundesbank trying to protect the famously stable 
Deutschmark and Chancellor Kohl wanting to send “a clear, unmistakable signal of hope 
and encouragement… to the people of the GDR.”11 
The disagreement did not end with just the Bundesbank and Bundesregierung. 
Rather every organization and interest group had an opinion on the matter, as this single 
decision could save or destroy not only the unification efforts, but also the economies of 
both Germanys. GDR politicians had recently run for Volkskammer election, calling for a 
1:1 turnover rate for monetary holdings and wages. Other organizations of the same 
opinion included the Federal Union of German Employers’ Association, the western 
SPD, parts of the CDU/CSU, and the Federal Minister of Labor. On the other side of the 
issue were the Bundesbank, Federal Finance Minister, and Federal Economics Ministry, 
all of which insisted on a 2:1 conversion rate for debts, savings accounts, wages, 
pensions, and cash holdings over DM 2,000. This proposal sparked massive 
demonstrations in the East. The Bundesbank’s proposal would lead to fewer economic 
                                                      
11
 Helmut Kohl. “Kohl’s Currency Union Proposal, 13 February 1990,” in Uniting 
Germany: Documents and Debates, 1944-1993, eds. Konrad H. Jarausch and Volker Gransow 
(Providence: Berghahn Books, 1994), 111. 
9 
 
 
 
losses in the West, but would place the Easterners at an even greater disadvantage. 
Federal Labor Minister Norbert Blüm declared that a conversion rate other than 1:1 
would “open up profound social fault lines and have destabilizing political 
consequences.” Furthermore, he added, East Germans would suffer “glaring losses 
relative to their previous, already lower, living standards… particularly pensioners, 
families, and the unemployed.”12  It quickly became clear that a 2:1 rate was ideal for the 
FRG Deutschmark and economy, but would ruin any chances for a socially and 
economically unified Germany. 
Although it was unfeasible for politicians to accept the Bundesbank’s proposal for 
the German Economic, Social, and Monetary Union (GEMSU), the 1:1 conversion rate 
was not free of consequences. The eventual decision, passed in May 1990, created a 
rather complex system of monetary holdings conversion to go into effect on 1 June. In 
essence, holdings and claims faced a 2:1 conversion rate; however, cash and savings 
accounts between DM 2,000 and 6,000 were eligible for a 1:1 rate, depending on the 
holder’s age. Firm’s debts and housing loans were both converted at a 2:1 conversion rate 
and, alone, totaled over 360 billion Ostmarks. 13 Unfortunately, as Pöhl showed 
Chancellor Kohl, a 1:1 rate would result in the bankruptcy of many GDR businesses. The 
Bundesbank President noted that with a 1:1 ratio, the GDR’s debt burden, which foreign 
creditors would receive in DMs, combined with their debts owed to the GDR national 
bank would translate to annual interest rates in excess of DM 20,000 million.14  
                                                      
12
 Ritter, The Price of German Unity, 152-153 
13
 Gerlinde Sinn and Hans-Werner Sinn, Jumpstart: The Economic Unification of 
Germany (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 51. 
14
 Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 237. 
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Because there was no single economic and socially ideal solution to the currency 
conversion, many problems arose in East Germany. One such problem faced by eastern 
German producers was a phenomenon called the “price-cost squeeze”. This resulted from 
former GDR businesses switching to Deutschmarks while having to set prices and cover 
costs, which included the ever-increasing wages.15 Furthermore, new exposure to West 
German and international open market competition naturally caused output prices to fall. 
Low prices translated to decreasing revenues across East Germany. By the end of the first 
year of unification, the combination of currency appreciation and unprecedented levels of 
competition led to a two-thirds fall in East German output and one-third fall in total 
national output.16 
The Council of Experts had worried and warned that introducing the Deutsche 
Mark too quickly would give East Germans the false illusion of closing the West-East 
gap in living standards.17 Although the politicians did not wish to give false hope, they 
wanted to create both psychological and economic unification – an impossible feat 
without a single currency. In reality, by placing more importance on social than economic 
unification, the GEMSU led to immediate economic turmoil that continued for several 
years. 
 
 
                                                      
15
 Thomas Lange and Geoffrey Pugh, The Economics of German Unification 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1998), 58. 
16
 Lange and Pugh, The Economics of German Unification, 59. 
17
 Michael Kreile, “The Political Economy of the New Germany,” in The New Germany 
and the New Europe,ed. Paul B. Stares (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992): 69, 
http://books.google.com/books?id=Q1d3OKCpEFIC&lpg=PA1&ots=j_TzZtBuQD&dq=the%20
new%20germany%20and%20the%20new%20europe&lr&pg=PA69#v=onepage&q=the%20new
%20germany%20and%20the%20new%20europe&f=false (accessed October 30, 2012). 
11 
 
 
 
2.2 Increasing Demand for Transfer Payments 
 The West German Basic Law protected all the Länder by guaranteeing equal 
living conditions throughout the country. Although the law was ratified in 1949 and 
amended twenty years before reunification even seemed viable, it declared that any 
Länder that acceded would also follow the Basic Law.18 Because achieving immediate 
social and economic equality was impossible, politicians had to decide on which factor 
they would place more emphasis. West Germans inevitably had to economically support 
the unification, but contested exactly how much they would sacrifice. As previously 
mentioned, the West German federal government was much more willing to financially 
support their eastern neighbors, but state-level governments were more concerned with 
protecting their constituents from the potential economic consequences of unification. 
While German politicians worked to economically and socially unite their 
countries, they also needed to create a way to finance GEMSU. Also in May 1990, West 
Germany created the “German Unity Fund”, which allocated DM 115 billion to East 
Germany over the first four years of reunification. The eleven West German Länder and 
the federal government agreed to split the burden evenly between themselves and the 
GDR to assist in financing the East German budget deficit (which was predicted to reach 
DM 50 billion) and social programs such as unemployment and welfare. 19 These 
politicians adopted many policies to address social problems in East Germany, but the 
                                                      
18
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Bonn, Germany, May 23, 1949): 
Article 72, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0320 (accessed 
October 17, 2012). 
19
 Ferdinand Protzman, “Germans in Accord on a ‘Unity Fund’,” New York Times (May 
17, 1990), 
http://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/108436868/13AB998BEF61DD73068/1?a
ccountid=10141. 
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German Unity Fund also acted as an effort to assuage the economic concerns of West 
German citizens. The fund functioned more to control the redistribution of the heavy 
financial burden between the federal government and the West German Länder than to 
finance the East German states, which had not yet officially become a part of the Federal 
Republic.20  
 In a very bold political move, reminiscent of George H.W. Bush’s “read my lips” 
gaffe, Chancellor Kohl promised to avoid raising income taxes by implementing the 
Unity Fund. To avoid raising western taxes, Bonn, the FRG capital, planned to take DM 
20 billion from government savings and borrow the rest of its share from capital markets. 
The federal states planned to borrow as well.21  Germany would soon learn that public 
borrowing alone could not sustain East Germany’s financial needs. Despite efforts to 
protect the West German taxpayers, politicians did not anticipate the increased East 
German need for assistance and the westerners would have to feel some economic strain. 
By 1992, the German Unity Fund had grown to DM 160.7 billion and the actual total of 
financial transfers reached DM 770 billion by 1994.22 To put this number into 
perspective, for the first six years of reunification each West German essentially paid DM 
3,000 and each East German received DM 12,600 annually.23  
                                                      
20
 Wolfgang Renzsch, “Financing German Unity: Fiscal Conflict Resolution in a 
Complex Federation,” Publius 28, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 132, http://www.jstor.org/stable/333145 
(accessed November 17, 2012). 
21
 Manfred Görtemaker, Unifying Germany, 1989-1990, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1994), 152. 
22
 Jens Hölscher and Johannes Stephan, “The ‘German Model’ in Decline,” in East 
Germany’s Economic Development since Unification: Domestic and Global Aspects, eds. Jens 
Hölscher and Anja Hochberg (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 31. 
23
 Michael Kaser, “The Eastern Länder as a Transition Economy” in East Germany’s 
Economic Development since Unification: Domestic and Global Aspects, eds. Jens Hölscher and 
Anja Hochberg (New York: St. Martni’s Press, 1998), 68. 
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When examining the German Unity Fund and Unification Treaty, it becomes 
increasingly clear that West German politicians decided when they would obey the Basic 
Law and when they would circumvent it. This inconsistency occurred in the name of 
equality and expediting the reunification process, but also in protecting West German 
citizens from economic repercussions.  Wolfgang Renzsch, a political scientist from the 
Universität Magdeburg, cited the Basic Law as the reason for the abrupt reunification and 
the efforts to converge both economies as quickly as possible. The Basic Law, however, 
also divides sales-tax revenue between Länder on a per capita basis. This led to extensive 
discourse and arguments between the West German states and the Federal government. 
Renzsch explained in his 1998 journal article that should East Germany receive equal 
amounts of tax revenue, the old Länder would lose and additional DM 4 to 5 billion. In 
their opinions, West Germany had more sales tax receipts than the East, but would 
receive the same revenue in return. The German Unity Fund had already established the 
West German financial burden and the western, state-level politicians were, therefore, 
unwilling to accept any further economic losses.24 For this reason, the old Länder 
proposed a staggered system in which the new Länder would receive 55 percent of the 
sales tax allocation in 1991, 70 percent in 1994, and then eventually the constitutionally 
mandated per capita allocation. This proposal passed initially, but in 1991 the newly 
confident leaders of the eastern Länder negotiated until their respective states earned 
what was their proportionate share according to Basic Law. 25 This process of sales tax 
allocation acts as yet another example of eastern and western politicians failing to find 
policies which would benefit both East and West Germans. The solution to this 
                                                      
24
 Renzsch, “Financing German Unity,” 135. 
25
 Renzsch, “Financing German Unity,” 134.  
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predicament resulted in a further economic burden on the West so as to allow the East to 
converge as quickly as possible.  
 
2.3 Re-Privatizing Expropriated Property 
 The tumultuous history of Germany created the complex issue of contested 
property ownership. Between the 1930s and 1980s, three separate initiatives confiscated 
private property. The first, led by the Nazis, targeted the Jewish population’s homes, 
industrial properties and land. The Soviet authorities led the second initiative, 
immediately following 1945, and targeted Junkers, or members of Prussian and eastern 
German nobility. The Bodenreform program seized millions of acres of agricultural land, 
as well as industrial property and real estate as reparation for the damage done to the 
Soviet Union during World War II. The final expropriation effort occurred after 1949 in 
the recently established GDR. The state seized properties to establish large agricultural 
cooperatives, private firms for nationalization, and the homes, lands, and accounts 
abandoned by refugees who had fled to freedom.26 As a result, West Germany had to 
decide how to distribute all of the soon-to-be-privatized property and industry. On June 
15, 1990 both governments passed the “Joint Government Declaration on Open Property 
Questions,” which was later incorporated into the Unification Treaty. 
2.3.a Property 
 The governments created the Joint Declaration in hopes of developing a socially 
responsible solution which could satisfy the citizens of both countries. Of the three 
aforementioned expropriation efforts, attempting to return property seized by the Soviet 
                                                      
26
 Smyser, Economy of United Germany, 161. 
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Union before the establishment of the GDR was not an option. However, the government 
would attempt restitution of some property seized by the Nazis, but mostly property 
seized by GDR authorities. This was an enormous undertaking, as almost five million 
Germans fled from East to West between 1950 and 1990 alone, leaving their properties 
and assets for the government’s seizure.27 Fortunately for those victims of 
“Aryanization”, GDR refugees, and their heirs, the joint governments chose a policy that 
would benefit their citizens rather than expedite economic unification. The Joint 
Declaration on the Settlement of Open Property Questions reflected this decision: 
II. Trusteeship administration and similar measures limiting the use of real estate, 
businesses, and other property must be rescinded. With this, citizens whose 
property was taken into state administration as a result of flight [from the GDR] 
or for other reasons will regain control of their property.28 
 
The document continued, providing the option to accept compensation instead of the 
property, compensation in cases where the property could not be returned, and protecting 
renters from eviction or steep increases in rent. 29  
 By mid-1991, Germans filed over 1.5 million claims for restitution, subjecting 
approximately one fourth of East German properties to claim. This created an overloaded 
and sluggish system for two reasons. First, it was unclear how to approach cases of 
ownership of buildings on land potentially owned by another claimant. Second, an 
extended period of poor record keeping in the GDR presented many cases of multiple 
claimants on the same property. As of 1993, the Officials at the Office for the Regulation 
                                                      
27
 Heinz Fassman and Rainer Munz, "International Migration Review." International 
Migration Review 28, no. 3 (Autumn, 1994) http://www.jstor.org/stable/2546819, 529. 
28
 Joint Declaration of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German Democratic Republic on the Settlement of Open Property Questions,(Bonn, Germany, 15 
June 1990), http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3099 
(accessed October 17, 2012). 
29
 Joint Declaration of the Governments.  
16 
 
 
 
of Property Questions forecast another ten years to close all of the files.30 The issues of 
property ownership promoted the rights of displaced citizens, but essentially halted the 
East German economy and stymied a smooth reunification process.   
 
2.3.b Industry 
 The widespread expropriations confiscated not only homes, but also land 
and businesses in an effort to create an economy planned from its production down to its 
distribution. This presented the West Germans with an enormous task: privatizing an 
economy in which 98 percent of the GDP was publicly produced and consisted of almost 
two hundred cartels controlled by government ministries. These cartels, or Kombinate, 
controlled almost all production, exports, and East German resources, creating a system 
antithetical to a market economy. For this reason, West Germany had to reallocate and 
restructure East German production.31 As well as addressing the issue of homes and real 
estate, the Joint Government Declaration addressed the question of expropriated 
businesses and firms: 
VII. For businesses and shareholdings that were incorporated into national 
property through confiscation of 1949 and 1972, the former owner will be given – 
taking into account how valuable the business has become – the business as a 
whole or shares or stocks in the company, provided that he does not wish to take 
advantage of compensation.32 
 
However, the issues mentioned above affected privatizing industry as well, creating an 
inefficient and slow process. By the ratification of the Unification Treaty, disagreements 
                                                      
30
 Lange and Pugh, The Economics of German Unification, 66. 
31
 Smyser, The Economy of United Germany, 151. 
32
 Joint Declaration of the Governments. 
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within the government would alter the Joint Declaration so as to stimulate the East 
German economy. 
The prolonging of privatization combined with prioritizing the return of property 
over compensation only contributed to the economic complications of unification. 
Economists and politicians both agreed that private investment could save the East 
German economy, but the problems with property ownership and consequent poor 
infrastructure effectively dissuaded private investors.33 Before ratifying the Unification 
Treaty, the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) urged reconsideration of 
placing property return above compensation, citing the need for legally secure 
investments. This resulted in a caveat in the Unification Treaty: 
…there shall be no return of property rights to real estate or buildings if the real 
estate or building concerned is required for urgent investment purposes to be 
specified in detail, particularly if it is to be used for the establishment of an 
industrial enterprise and the implementation of this investment decision deserves 
support from a general economic viewpoint, above all if it creates or safeguards 
jobs.34 
 
As with all other aspects of unification, two different questions emerged for West 
German leaders: should the government place more importance on social or economic 
issues? Those who agreed with the SPD were concerned that the imminent possibility of 
a property returning to its former owner would deter private investors and further slow 
the efforts of privatization. Other groups supported placing restitution above 
compensation because of the social principles, encouraging the return of property to its 
original owners. These groups stressed the importance of allowing formerly 
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disenfranchised Germans to assist in the rebuilding of their economy. Furthermore, in 
their opinion, how could a true market economy exist without placing the utmost 
importance on private ownership of the means of production?35 In reality, as German 
historian Gerhard A. Ritter explains, more factors than simply privatization deterred 
private investors from East Germany, including the poor GDR infrastructure, the 
inefficiency in most East German enterprises, and the fact that transfer payments went 
more towards consumption than investment. German economists had already stressed 
that a lack of private investment in the East German economy would result in a painfully 
slow recovery and an exceedingly difficult rebuilding process. 
 
2.3.c The Treuhandanstalt 
 The issue of privatization was a significant hurdle in the reunification of 
Germany. To assist with this process, the East German government founded the 
Treuhandanstalt, or Trust Agency. This institution had the purpose of protecting 
centrally-owned properties from the collapsing state. However, the Treuhand Act and the 
Unification Treaty morphed the agency into one which officially privatized and 
reorganized the properties it originally protected. The Treuhand took charge of three 
types of properties: state-owned businesses, land, and assets such as mining properties, 
pharmacies, and the Ministry of State Security. The sheer number of properties was 
overwhelming. By mid-1990, the Treuhand owned over eight thousand businesses and 
Kombinate, over forty thousand factories, almost 37 billion square meters of farmland 
and forestry, and almost two thousand other assets. At the time, approximately 46 percent 
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of East Germans were employed by businesses and assets under control of the 
Treuhand.36 Although the amount of land and other assets could not increase, the former 
Communist control of businesses resulted in reorganization and consolidation of 
properties. The restitution and selling efforts meant that these properties needed to be 
broken up, increasing the number of enterprises for which the Treuhand was 
responsible.37 
 Like many other aspects of the unification process, the business turnover rate 
initially moved very slowly, delaying a quick economic recovery. The Treuhand 
functioned in a way which favored West German buyers. The East German entrepreneurs 
and businessmen only had money from the currency conversion, were therefore asset 
poor and required loans. To acquire a loan, however, they needed equity capital, which 
they did not have. 38 Equity capital is an investment in businesses, such as stock. Because 
these businesses were owned by the state, East Germans did not have any stakes in the 
enterprises, and therefore no equity capital with which to receive loans. The West 
Germans however, despite having equity capital, did not have excess capital with which 
to invest in the East. Although the West German economy fared the much better during 
reunification than that of East Germany, between 1990 and 1992 the reunification deficit 
increased by more than DM 100 billion. This increased real interest rates, turned 
Germany into a capital-importing country, and did not leave excess capital for private 
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investment in the East.39 Artificially high wages in East Germany further contributed to 
the slow rate of business sales. The high wages resulted from West Germans negotiating 
East German wages so as to prevent low-wage competitors. They hoped to prevent 
migration to the West with enticingly high East German wages, but in reality this 
increased unemployment and decreased the value the appeal, of Treuhand enterprises.40 
 In an effort to appease the numerous critics of rapid privatization of large 
enterprises, the Treuhandanstalt created a branch in late 1991 called Management-
Kommanditgesellschaft (MKG). This translates to Management-Limited Commercial 
Partnership and it focused on restructuring enterprises that had future promise, but no 
active buyers in the short run.41 The East German Land of Saxony also led the ATLAS 
initiative which, when translated, means: Selected Treuhandanstalt Firms Registered by 
the Land for Restructuring. ATLAS petitioned to the Treuhand for Land control of 
restructuring rather than liquidation of “regionally significant” companies. This effort 
helped save industrially important companies such as Jenoptik GmbH, an optical 
equipment, precision instrument, and electronics manufacturer.42 By 1993, the 
Treuhandanstalt had privatized over 80 percent of its holdings and prepared to shut its 
doors. Four years after its founding, the Treuhand closed and four organizations took its 
place, the most important being: Bundesanstalt für verinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben 
(BvS), which monitored newly privatized firms’ contracts, and Beteiligungs-
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Management-Gesellschaft Berlin (BMGB), which was responsible for the management, 
restructuring, and privatization of the Treuhand’s remaining eighty firms.43 
 Although the Treuhandanstalt itself was liquidated, the German economy had not 
come close to recovery. By 1993 the entire country was solidly in recession. The 
Treuhand itself had incurred approximately DM 230,000 million in debt, the German 
Unity Fund, which had DM 115,000 million over five years, was not nearly enough,44 
and the average net monetary wealth of an East German private household was only one-
third of a western household.45 The government would have to find new taxes and 
reforms to rescue the newly united economy. 
 
2.4 Combatting Rising Unemployment 
 One of the benefits of Communist Germany was low unemployment and 
high job security. In 1989, just before unification, the East German workforce consisted 
of almost 9 million citizens – well over half of the population.46 Because of the 
requirement to work and the deliberate efforts of planning committees to utilize the full 
labor capacity of the workforce, East Germany was entirely unequipped to handle the 
inevitable rise in unemployment.47 However, no capitalist society functions with full 
employment and between the Treuhandanstalt and natural job loss due to exposure to 
competition, unemployment would rise at staggering rates.  
                                                      
43Anderson, German Unification and the Union of Europe, 126. 
44
 Ritter, Price of German Unity, 97. 
45
 Ritter, Price of German Unity, 281. 
46
 Lange and Pugh, The Economics of German Unification, 18.  
47
 Ritter, Price of German Unity, 134.  
22 
 
 
 
To combat the social ramifications of a tumultuous economic transformation, East 
Germany passed the Employment Promotion Law, in June 1990. The Employment 
Promotion Law sought to adopt western labor market policies and attempted to offset the 
stress caused by the impending increase in eastern unemployment. However, the EPL 
differed from western policies in several ways. One aspect was the short-time working 
benefit. Like western labor laws, the short-time benefit provided workers who cancelled 
working time for social reasons almost their full wage. For example, a worker taking time 
off for reasons relating to their child could receive up to 68 percent of their net wages. 
The GDR version of the EPL, however, also made this benefit available to those workers 
whose job was not expected to survive the unification. Workers participating in retraining 
programs also qualified, and could even receive a percentage of their wage even higher 
than that of short-time.48 Within the first year following the monetary union in July 1990, 
between 6.8 and 8 million workers received short-time pay. This translates to between 75 
and 90 percent of the East German workforce received short-time benefits, or 
compensation for not working. Many West Germans, including the Federal Labor 
Ministry, found the East German version of the EPL inefficient and troublesome. The 
FLM fundamentally opposed minimum protection for the unemployed, fearing that it 
would diminish the incentive to find new jobs, as well as present opportunities for benefit 
abuse. Despite these fears, Labor Minister Blüm wrote to Dieter-Julius Cronenberg, an 
FDP politician, explaining why he supported such generous policies. “The shift from a 
planned economy to a Social Market economy with virtually no transition period [was] a 
unique economic and socio-political event.” Blüm continued, saying it was policy-
                                                      
48
 Ritter, Price of German Unity, 172. 
23 
 
 
 
makers’ responsibility to, “minimize the risks wherever possible, in the interests of those 
people affected in the GDR”.49 These sentences summarize the entire reunification 
process. Federal-level politicians, more often than not, felt it was their duty to promote 
social benefits in the East over supporting the western economy. 
 The extent to which unemployment would increase across the entire reunified 
Germany did not become clear for several years. While the Treuhandanstalt liquidated 
firms in the East, unemployment naturally increased. The opposite effect, however, 
initially occurred in the West. The newly opened society caused an overwhelming 
increase in demand for Western goods, causing employment in the old Länder to increase 
from 28 to 28.7 million in 1991. Although the numbers show western employment as 
increasing, these jobs did not exclusively go to West Germans. The data shows 700,000 
new jobs, but in that time the number of West Germans registered as unemployed only 
decreased by 300,000. This means that East German migrants took over half of these new 
jobs. The initial boost to the West German economy, which included a growing GNP and 
stable prices, however, did not last.50 As shown in the Graph of German Unemployment 
(Figure 1), West German unemployment began to rise in 1992 and did not begin to 
decrease until 1997 – after five years of record high unemployment rates across the entire 
country. In contrast, East German unemployment increased dramatically for more than a 
decade following GEMSU. Notably, between 1999 and 2003 East German 
unemployment more than doubled that in the West.  
 After several years of steadily increasing unemployment rates, it became clear 
that efforts, such as the EPL, were failing to bring unemployment down to an 
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economically acceptable level, especially since the officially recorded statistics did not 
include “hidden unemployment.” For example, Figure 1 shows average unemployment 
in 1996 as approximately 12 percent. Including the 1.5 million Germans in early 
retirement or short-time working would bring the unemployment number closer to 15 
percent.51 Further political efforts in 1996 included the Action Program for Investment 
and Jobs and Program for more Growth and Employment). The Investment and Jobs 
Program sought several reforms, including deregulation of businesses, changes in 
corporate taxation, and creating incentives for start-up businesses. The Growth and 
Employment Program focused more on cutting labor costs and public spending. The 
program reduced benefits such as sick-pay and paid vacation, prevented any increases in 
monthly child-benefit allowances, and implemented a two year pay-freeze for public 
sector employees.52 These efforts to reduce the state role in the economy, to create more 
competitive businesses, and to reduce unemployment reflect one of the few areas of 
reunification in which policies placed more importance on economic rather than social 
issues. East Germany had transformed from a Communist society with a workforce 
consisting of well over half the population to an open market economy where one-in-
seven workers were jobless. 53 With such disparity between the job levels in East and 
West Germany, the Basic Law, calling for equal living conditions throughout the entire 
country, could not be followed without sacrificing some social benefits, which 
discouraged people in the East from seeking employment. 
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3. Conclusion: Social Policies Drove Reunification 
 The long and messy reunification process began in 1989 when policymakers 
hoped to quickly create a unified Germany. West Germany had prospered since World 
War II with a stable currency, an impressive GDP, and relatively low inflation. At the 
same time, East Germany had faltered. The planned economy and its massive Kombinate 
resulted in little competition between businesses. It also resulted in inefficient allocation 
of resources, lower rates of production, and a much weaker currency than the Deutsche 
Mark. When the Wall fell, easterners rushed west to embrace capitalism and drink Coca-
Cola. Neither country’s citizens, however, fully anticipated the consequences they would 
face, nor the sacrifices they would have to make. 
 Policymakers in both governments faced a power struggle. The West German 
Central Bank, the Federal Government, the Länder, and the East German politicians had 
to come to agreements on four major issues. The decisions surrounding currency 
conversion, transfer payments, privatization and unemployment would influence both the 
psychology and the economy of the unified country. The dilemma faced by these 
politicians was as follows: should they pursue policies that place more importance on 
social or economic issues? Ultimately, social factors trumped economics. 
 The unique power struggle between the Bundesbank and the Federal Government 
stemmed from the Central Bank’s autonomy. Founded before West German officially 
became a country, the Bundesbank operated free from political authorities and pressures. 
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Its main responsibility was to oversee the stability of the Deutsche Mark and control 
inflation.54 In terms of reunification, the Bundesbank advocated for austere measures that 
would protect the Deutsche Mark. The proposal of a 2:1 currency conversion rate would 
decrease losses in the West, but would cripple East German savings and businesses. It 
became clear that for the sake of a truly reunified Germany, the Bundesbank would have 
to forgo its autonomy and allow the politicians to pursue socially conscientious decisions. 
 The Central Bank played a smaller role in the other key issues, where 
disagreements were more prevalent between the different levels of politicians. In the case 
of transfer payments, politicians created the German Unity Fund. This allocated DM 115 
million for West Germany to assist with the inevitable increase in the East German 
budget deficit. It became clear in the first year of reunification that the German Unity 
Fund grossly underestimated how much money the East would need. This sparked a 
negative response from the Länder politicians, who were most concerned with their 
constituents’ well-being. In accordance with the German Basic Law, which declares 
equal living conditions throughout Germany, the state-level politicians had to yield to the 
Federal Government and the East German need for more economic support. The ever-
increasing amounts of transfer payments caused an economic setback in the West in the 
name of equalizing living conditions in the entire country.  
The social benefits in the East were most strongly supported by the privatization 
efforts. Policymakers had to decide if they should return expropriated property to 
disenfranchised Germans, or to encourage private investment by selling the properties to 
the highest bidders. Because Nazis and Communists had confiscated the property and 
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because the government wanted East Germans to feel involved in the reunification, the 
Joint Declaration on Open Property Settlements declared that former property-owners or 
their heirs could reclaim what had once been theirs. The overwhelming number of 
claimants combined with the poor record keeping of the GDR made this process 
excruciatingly slow. Private investors from the West had nothing in which to invest, 
slowing the East German economy’s convergence, but the citizens had the hope of 
reclaiming their properties. 
 Policymakers put social issues aside for one key element of reunification: 
unemployment. They had predicted a swift and relatively easy reunification and believed 
this was occurring when West German unemployment initially decreased. East German 
unemployment, however, increased tremendously and that in the West soon followed. 
The eastern unemployment policies provided extremely generous unemployment 
benefits. Shortly before reunification, East Germany adopted the Employment Promotion 
Law. The EPL fundamentally mirrored West German employment benefits, but modified 
them in more generous ways. From paying workers to stay home to allowing West 
German unions to wage bargain in the East, huge amounts of money were spent on an 
unproductive workforce, further crippling the East German economy. Part of the problem 
stemmed from unemployed workers who received substantial pay and were therefore not 
incentivized to find new work. Unemployment increased at staggering rates, and 
policymakers realized that they would have to make social sacrifices to save the 
economy. With a more austere plan, they pursued deregulation of business, decreasing 
labor costs, and giving incentives to start-ups. These policies sought a decrease in 
unemployment as well as more efficient costs of production. Although the unemployed 
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received fewer benefits, the government hoped to encourage new business and galvanize 
the East German economy. 
The West and East reunited quickly, but not without ramifications. Citizens on 
either side of the Berlin Wall paid significant prices in the name of unity. The West 
poured money into the East, while East Germans suffered from not only unemployment 
and low productivity, but also from the inferiority complex that ran deep in the East. 
West German politicians, in order to create a united Germany, did not pursue the most 
economically beneficial policies for their own country. The entire country’s economy 
stumbled in the 1990s but began to recover in the 2000s. The short-term pursuit of 
policies that emphasized social over economic advantages did not prevent Germany from 
returning to its traditional role as the economic leader of Europe by the turn of the 
century. In conclusion, politicians fought and disagreed on which policies were most 
important to adopt, but in obeying the German Basic Law, they created a more powerful 
and peaceful union. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Graph of German Unemployment 1990-200355 
 
 
 
 
 
{Image Redacted}
                                                      
55
 Dr. Detlef Pollack, “Support for Democracy in Eastern and Western Germany: an 
Attempt to Explain the Differences,” http://georgetown.edu/sfs/cges/working_papers.html 
(accessed October 27, 2012). 
  
30 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
Anderson, Jeffrey. German Unification and the Union of Europe. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Barro, Robert. “Eastern Germany’s Long Haul to Prosperity.” Wall Street Journal,  
May 7, 1991, 
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/308038786?
accountid=10141 (accessed September 19, 2012). 
 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, Germany, May 23, 1949,  
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0320 
(accessed October 17, 2012). 
 
Bastian, Jens. “The Institutional Architecture of an Alliance for Jobs.” In East  
Germany’s Economic Development since Unification: Domestic and Global 
Aspects, edited by Jens Hölscher and Anja Hochberg, 120-140. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998.  
 
Berger, Helge. “The “Bundesbank’s” Path to Independence: Evidence from the  
1950s.” Public Choice 93, no. 3/4 (1997), http://www.jstor.org/stable/30024310 
(accessed October 28, 2012). 
 
Beyer, Andreas, Vitor Gaspar, Christina Gerberding, and Otmar Issing. “Opting Out of  
the Great Inflation: German Monetary Policy After the Break Down of Bretton 
Woods.” NBER Working Paper Series, no. 14596 (December 2008), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14596 (accessed October 5, 2012).  
 
Brucker, Herbert. Privatization in East Germany: A Neo-Institutional Analysis. 
 London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997. 
 
Bundesbank Act, October 22, 1992 as amended by the Sixth Act Amending the  
 Bundesbank Act of December 22, 1997.  
 http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BBankG.htm  
 
Burda, Michael C. “Factor Reallocation in Eastern Germany After Reunification.” The  
American Economic Review 96, no. 2 (May, 2006), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034675 (accessed October 27, 2012). 
 
 
  
31 
 
 
Carlberg, Michael. “Makroökonomik der deutschen Vereinigung.” Jahrbuch für  
Wirtschaftswissenschaften/Review of Economics 46, no. 1 (1995), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20714801 (accessed September 19, 2012). 
Chandra, Nirmal Kumar. “Costs of German Unity.” Economic and Political Weekly 25,  
no. 30 (July 28, 1990), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4396561 (accessed November 
17, 2012). 
 
Fassman, Heinz, and Rainer Munz. "International Migration Review." International  
 Migration Review 28, no. 3 (Autumn, 1994),  
 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2546819 (accessed October 11, 2012). 
 
Fuchs-Schündeln, Nicola. “The Response of Household Saving to the Large Shock of  
German Reunification.” The American Economic Review 98, no. 5 (December 
2008), http://www.jstor.org/stable/29730153 (accessed September 19, 2012). 
 
Görtemaker, Manfred. Unifying Germany, 1989-1990. New York: St. Martin’s Press,  
 1994. 
 
Hämäläinen, Pekka Kalevi. Uniting Germany: Actions and Reactions. Boulder:  
 Westview Press, 1994. 
 
Hölscher, Jens and Johannes Stephan. “The ‘German Model’ in Decline.” In East  
Germany’s Economic Development since Unification: Domestic and Global 
Aspects, edited by Jens Hölscher and Anja Hochberg, 20-36. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998. 
 
Jarausch, Konrad H., and Volker Gransow, eds. Uniting Germany: Documents and  
 Debates, 1944-1993. Providence: Berghahn Books, 1994. 
 
Joint Declaration of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the  
 German Democratic Republic on the Settlement of Open Property Questions,  
Bonn, Germany, 15 June 1990, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3099 (accessed October 17, 2012). 
 
Kaser, Michael. “Post-Communist Privatization: Flaws in the Treuhand Model.” Acta  
Oeconomica 48, no. 1/2 (1996), http://www.jstor.org/stable/40729648 (accessed 
November 11, 2012).   
 
Kaser, Michael. “The Eastern Länder as a Transition Economy.” In East Germany’s  
Economic Development since Unification: Domestic and Global Aspects, edited 
by Jens Hölscher and Anja Hochberg, 53-78. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998.  
 
 
 
  
32 
 
Kohl, Helmut. Ten-Point Plan for German Unity. Bonn, Germany, November 28, 1989,  
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=223 
(accessed October 17, 2012).  
 
 
Lange, Thomas and Geoffrey Pugh. The Economics of German Unification.  
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1998. 
 
Maier, Charles S. Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany.  
 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
 
Neumann, Manfred J.M. “Geldpolitik in verändertem Umfeld.” Weltwirtschaftliches  
Archiv 128, no. 2 (1992), http://jstor.org/stable/40440112 (accessed September 
19, 2012).  
 
Pollack, Detlef. “Support for Democracy in Eastern and Western Germany: an  
Attempt to Explain the Differences.” European Journal of Sociology 45, no. 2 
(August 2004), http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003975604001456 
(accessed October 27, 2012). 
 
Protzman, Ferdinand. “Germans in Accord on a ‘Unity Fund’.” New York Times, May  
17, 1990, 
http://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/108436868/13AB998BEF6
1DD73068/1?accountid=10141 (accessed November 1, 2012).  
 
Renzsch, Wolfgang. “Financing German Unity: Fiscal Conflict Resolution in a  
Complex Federation.” Publius 28, no. 4 (Autumn 1998), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/333145 (accessed November 17, 2012).  
 
Ritter, Gerhard Albert. The Price of German Unity. New York: Oxford University Press  
Inc., 2011. 
 
Roesler, Jörg. “The Rise and Fall of the Planned Economy in the German Democratic  
Republic, 1945-89.” Germany History 9, no. 1 (1991), 
http://gh.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/1/46.full.pdf+html (accessed October 27, 
2012). 
 
Seitz, Helmut. “Fiscal Policy, Deficits and Politics of Subnational Governments: The  
Case of the German Länder.” Public Choice 102, no. 3/4 (2000), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30026234 (accessed October 17, 2012). 
 
Sinn, Gerlinde, and Hans-Werner Sinn. Jumpstart: The Economic Unification of 
 Germany. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992. 
 
 
  
33 
 
 
Sinn, Hans-Werner. “Privatization in East Germany.” NBER Working Papers Series,  
no. 3998 (February 1992), http://www.nber.org/papers/w3998.pdf (accessed 
September 24, 2012). 
 
 
Smyser, W. R. The Economy of United Germany: Colossus at the Crossroads. New  
 York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992.  
 
Stares, Paul B. New Germany and the New Europe Washington, DC: The Brookings  
 Institution, 1992.  
http://books.google.com/books?id=Q1d3OKCpEFIC&lpg=PA1&ots=j_TzZtBuQ
D&dq=the%20new%20germany%20and%20the%20new%20europe&lr&pg=PA
69#v=onepage&q=the%20new%20germany%20and%20the%20new%20europe&
f=false 
 
Treaty Between the FRG and the GDR on the Establishment of the Unity of Germany.  
Berlin, Germany, August 31, 1990, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=78 (accessed October 17, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
